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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
resolve them. Further, the grant of specific performance in such a situation
is contrary to at least two well-established principles of Equity; namely, that
the court will not grant such awards when they will prove to be futile, op-
pressive or inequitable 35 (defendant cannot get the mortgage financing and
will not be able to comply without it), nor will specific performance be granted
in contracts requiring continuous supervision over a long period of time36
(plaintiff estimates that the project will take nine months to a year to con-
plete). Finally, the question may be raised as to whether the award is "mutual,
final, and definite" as is required by Section 1462. Plaintiff's store represents
one-half the total cost of the project, and consequently, if defendant is com-
pelled only to build one-half of the shopping center, it would appear that the
award is open to some question on the basis of its finality.
Taking into consideration the necessity of preserving the sanctity of
arbitration awards, this writer feels that the Court, in its desire to avoid
trampling upon the intent of the Legislature and to a lesser extent, in its
quest to insure a comity of decision, has sacrificed the sound and time-tested
rules by which decrees of specific performance may be Judged good or bad.
An opposite decision here could have meant that the court had found the
decision of the arbitrators offensive in one of the respects set out in sub-
division four, and, if this was the interpretation, no damage would be done
the arbitration process. An opposite decision would not have signified a with-
drawal from the position taken in the Ruppert and Staklinski cases. In those
cases the question before the Court was whether the best interests of the
litigants would be served by affirmance of the award. Here, the Court must
also consider its own continuing interest in the proceedings.
If the line of decision from Ruppert to Staklinski, and now, to Grayson,
indicates the development of a new dichotomy in the law, one may ask if it
is necessary. If the purpose of arbitration is speedy justice, does this mean the
court must tolerate gross inconsistencies between its own conception of justice
and the intuitions of laymen in order. to insure the efficacy of arbitration?
This question is left unresolved in the present case.
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING PUBLIc ENTITY
Section 3813 of the Education Law provides that "No action or special
proceeding... shall be prosecuted or maintained against any school district...
unless it shall appear ... that a written verified claim ... was presented within
three months after the accrual of such claim."
The issues presented in Board of Education v. Heckler Electric Co.37
were: (1) whether this statute applied to the commencement of arbitration
35. In re Feuer Transportation, 295 N.Y. 87, 65 N.E.2d 178 (1946).
36. Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Copper Co., 157 N.Y. 60, 51 N.E. 408 (1898).
37. 7 N.Y.2d 476, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1960).
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proceedings which had been provided for by contract, and (2) whether this
question should have been decided by the court or by the arbitrators.
In the instant case a construction contract between The Board of Edu-
cation and subcontractor Heckler contained an arbitration clause. Heckler
made a demand for submission to arbitration. The Board of Education moved
for a stay of arbitration which was denied at Special Term. On appeal to the
Appellate Division the motion was granted,38 the Court assigning as the primary
ground for its decision Heckler's failure to give notice as required by Section
3813 of the Education Law.
The Court of Appeals held that compliance with Section 3813 was a con-
dition precedent to arbitration and that whether this condition was satisfied
or not was for the court rather than the arbitrators to-decide.30
In order to determine that Section 3813 was applicable in the instant
case, the Court first had to decide whether arbitration fell within the classifica-
tion of "special proceeding". In 1923, the Appellate Division, in In re Inter-
ocean Mercantile Corporation,4" reviewed the law, and found that non-statutory
arbitration was not a special proceeding under Section 308 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act permitting the taking of testimony by deposition. Subsequent to, and
as a result of this case, Section 1459 of the Civil Practice Act was passed
which provided that "arbitration of a controversy under a contract .. .shall
be deemed a special proceeding". Thereafter several cases interpreting Sec-
tion 1459 of the Civil Practice Act have held that arbitration is a special
proceeding, 41 but none of these cases involved the question of whetlier arbi-
tration is a special proceeding within the meaning of Section 3813 of the
Education Law." Implicit in the holding of the Court in the instant case (that
compliance with Section 3813 of the Education Law is a condition precedent
to arbitration) must be the decision that Section 1459 of the Civil Practice
Act makes arbitration a special proceeding within the meaning of Section
3813 of the Education Law.
There are decisions holding that failure to give notice as required by
Section 3813 bars both contract and tort actions in a court of law.42 There
are also decisions holding that if a time limitation is provided for in the arbi-
tration contract itself, failure to give notice within that time limitation is a
bar to arbitration.43 In the instant case, the Court held that even though there
was no time limitation in the arbitration contract itself, Section 3813 provided
a time limitation. Thus compliance with the statute is an additional obliga-
tion implicit in the arbitration contract.
38. 8 A.D.2d 940, 190 N.Y.S.2d 942 (2d Dep't 1959).
39. Supra note 37.
40. 204 App. Div. 284, 197 N.Y. Supp. 706 (Ist Dep't 1923).
41. Hosiery Mfrs. Corp. v. Goldston, 238 N.Y. 22, 143 N.E. 779 (1924); In re Inter-
ocean Mercantile Corp., 207 App. Div. 164, 201 N.Y. Supp. 753 (Ist Dep't 1923).
42. Kinner v. Board of Education, 6 A.D.2d 204, 175 N.Y.S.2d 707 (4th Dep't 1958);
In re Brown, .303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952).
43. In re Ketchum, 20 Misc. 2d 736, 70 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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As to the question of whether the court or the arbitrators should decide
the applicability of Section 3813 of the Education Law, there is no direct
precedent. There is a line of cases containing dicta to the effect that all issues
arising subsequent to the making of the contract should be decided by the
arbitrators, and that the only issues a court may consider is the making of a
valid contract or the failure to comply with it." In these cases the courts, de-
sirous of upholding the intention of the parties, reason that since the parties
provided for arbitration they must have wanted all issues to be decided by
the arbitrators. However, in the instant case the Court apparently felt that
this dicta did not apply, because the question of notice is a pre-requisite to
the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
FOR PURPOSES OF CIVM PRACTICE AcT § 21 A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
"EXISTS" AT TIhXE OF ACCMINT.
A wrongful death action was commenced on July 14, 1958, arising from
an automobile accident that occurred on March 6, 1955, allegedly due to the
negligence of defendant's intestate, who received fatal injuries and died on
the day of the accident. Three days later, on March 9, 1955, the defendant's
intestate was followed in death by plaintiff's intestate. The Appellate Divi-
sion' affirmed the lower court's order granting plaintiff's motion to strike out the
defense of the Statute of Limitations. Although the wrongful death action
had not yet accrued at the time of the wrongdoer's death, the Court of Appeals,
in Gibson v. Meean,2 affirmed the Appellate Division and held that the pro-
visions of Section 21 of the Civil Practice Act,3 which suspends the applicable
Statute of Limitations for a period of 18 months when "a person against whom
a cause of action exists" dies, applied so as to toll the two year statute.
The courts of New York have found no difficulty in applying Section
21 in those cases where the wrongdoer had died after the respective claim had
once accrued. 4 However, they have previously refused to apply it in cases
44. In re Terminal Auxillar Maritima, 6 N.Y.2d 294, 189 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1959); In re
Paloma, 3 N.Y.2d 572, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958) ; In re Lipman, 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817(1942); In re Tuttman, 274 App. Div. 395, 83 N.Y.S.2d.651 (1st Dep't 1948).
1. 7 A.D.2d 986, 183 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1st Dep't 1959).
2. 7 N.Y.2d 93, 195 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1959).
3. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 21:
Effect of death of person liable: The term of 18 months after the death within
this state of a person against whom a cause of action exists, or of a person who
shall have died within 60 days after an attempt shall have been made to com-
mence an action against him pursuant to the provision of this article, is not a
part of the time limited for the commencement of an action against his executor
or administrator.
4. Butler v. Price, 271 App. Div. 359, 65 N.Y.S.2d 688 (4th Dep't 1946); In re
McGowan's Estate, 174 Misc. 928, 22 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
